Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan Part 1: Master Plan

2. Planning Basis

The planning basis describes the nature of the hazards associated with nuclear emergencies, the role of federal organizations in responding to these hazards, the types of nuclear or radiological emergency events for which the FNEP may be used, and the principles and needs that are relevant to the FNEP in planning and preparing to respond to such events.

2.1 Nature of the Hazard

The main hazard associated with a nuclear or radiological emergency is the potential or actual release of radioactive material into the environment, and the health effects that may result from exposure and widespread radioactive contamination. These hazards may be either short-term or long-term. Short-term hazards may occur in the early phase of a nuclear emergency, and require timely and effective measures to mitigate their impact. These may include exposures arising directly from radioactive material released into the air or water, or deposited on the ground. Long-term hazards include those that continue to exist for extended periods, and may include protracted contamination of food, water and property. Short-term and long-term societal and economic impacts may also be expected.

2.2 Nature of the Response and Role of Federal Organizations

Emergency response typically requires special interventions to mitigate the impacts of the expected short-term and long-term hazards. In this context, such interventions include all actions and provisions beyond normal procedures that are undertaken to manage the emergency, including all emergency organization structures, response actions, communications and public information and directives.

In the event of a nuclear emergency in Canada or affecting Canadians, federal departments and agencies will be called upon to respond, and support affected provinces, in those areas relevant to their mandate. The extent and focus of federal involvement will depend on the scale and nature of the emergency situation, the level of support required by the affected province(s), and the nature of the interventions required.

2.3 Scale and Nature of Potential Events

Subject to the limitations listed in Section 1.5, the FNEP applies to accidents or emergencies occurring at licensed nuclear facilities in Canada or abroad, involving nuclear powered vessels or vessels containing nuclear materials in Canadian waters, or other serious radiological threats that will or could impact Canada or Canadians abroad.

2.3.1 An event at a nuclear facility in Canada or in the United States along the Canada/United States border ⁷

Although the probability of an emergency at a licensed nuclear facility resulting in a large emission of radioactive material is very low, its impact could be serious. Past events such as 1979 Three Mile Island and 1986 Chernobyl accidents provide reasonable bounds for determining an appropriate planning basis.

For each nuclear generating station in Canada, in addition to the on-site emergency plan which is under the responsibility of the owner/operator, an off-site nuclear emergency plan involving both municipal and provincial levels must be in place. The latter should detail how to implement urgent protective actions in the emergency planning zones near a licensed nuclear facility (e.g., access control, sheltering, evacuation, administering thyroid blocking agent), and ingestion control measures for a larger ingestion exposure emergency planning zone (e.g., food controls on locally produced food, closing local drinking water supplies, quarantine of farm animals).

Provinces which could most likely be affected by a nuclear emergency at a licensed nuclear facility are Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and, to a lesser extent, Nova Scotia (from the Point Lepreau Station, in New Brunswick), and British Columbia (from the Washington Nuclear Plant, in Washington State, U.S.A.). The current range of emergency planning zones in use by various jurisdictions are contained in the relevant provincial planning documents (see Provincial References, Appendix 2).

2.3.2 An event involving vessels visiting Canada or in transit through Canadian waters

This category includes events involving nuclear powered vessels, or vessels carrying fissionable or radioactive material, visiting Canada or in transit through Canadian waters. Naval reactors have considerably lower power ratings than nuclear generating stations and contain less radioactive material. Furthermore, nuclear powered vessels operate at low or zero power while along side in a Canadian naval port. As a result, a serious accident involving a nuclear powered vessel could result in similar but less extensive effects than from an emergency at a nuclear facility. For planning purposes, National Defence uses 1-5 km as an emergency planning zone for urgent protective actions around naval bases which are ports of call for nuclear powered vessels. An ingestion exposure emergency planning zone is not considered essential. However, should an accident happen, food and soil sampling and analysis may be required to ensure the safety of the population living in the immediate vicinity of the accident site. Nuclear powered vessels visit ports in Nova Scotia (Halifax) and British Columbia (Esquimalt and Nanoose).

At present, no vessels are authorized to carry significant quantities of fissionable substances from irradiated fuel as cargo through Canadian waters. However, future shipments of this nature are a possibility.

For events of this nature, the FNEP, or portions thereof, may be implemented on the specific request of a federal department or agency leading the response to these types of events.

2.3.3 An event involving a nuclear facility in the southern United States or in a foreign country

As the 1986 Chernobyl accident demonstrated, the effect on Canada of a nuclear emergency at a reactor station distant from Canada is limited. Small quantities of radioactive material may reach Canada. Although radioactive materials could be detectable, they would not likely pose a significant threat to public health and safety, property or the environment in Canada from direct exposure to fallout. The focus of the response would likely be on:

• 1. Controlling food imported from areas near the accident;
• 2. Assessing impacts on Canadians living or travelling near the accident site;
• 3. Assessing impacts in Canada and informing the public; and
• 4. Coordinating the response or assistance to requests from either a foreign power or an international agency.

Events involving United States nuclear generating stations along the Canada/United States border are covered in Section 2.3.1 above.

2.3.4 Other serious radiological events

Examples of other serious radiological events include malevolent acts involving improvised nuclear or radiation dispersal devices, or use of conventional explosives on facilities known to use or store radioactive sources; or the re-entry of a nuclear powered satellite, such as the 1978 crash of COSMOS 954 in the Northwest Territories.

The coordinated response to a potential or actual release of radioactive material resulting from other serious radiological events would be essentially the same whether it resulted from an accidental or deliberate act. For fixed facilities and materials in transit, the emergency response can be planned in more detail. However, planning for other events is complicated by variances in the magnitude of the threat, location of the source, degree of destruction of supporting infrastructures, or by rapidly evolving situations.

The FNEP, or specific portions thereof, may be implemented in support of a province or a federal department/agency leading the federal response to these and other events requiring measures to protect public health and safety from sudden uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials in the environment.

In the event of sabotage or a terrorist threat involving or leading to the release or potential release of radioactive material, the federal government response would be coordinated under the auspices of the National Counter-Terrorism Plan [17] led by the Solicitor General for Canada. The Solicitor General's department may request activation of parts of the FNEP National Support Structure to provide technical and operational advice on potential radiological impacts and protective measures.

2.4 Planning Principles

In accordance with the scale and nature of the event, a nuclear emergency could result in the widespread, trans-boundary distribution of radioactive material, with consequences which would implicate multiple jurisdictions, departments/agencies and orders of government. Federal and provincial departments/agencies have therefore agreed that the following planning principles are directly relevant to the FNEP:

First Principle:

The responsibility to deal with emergencies is placed first on the organization responsible for the facility, then on successive orders of government as the resources, expertise, or mandates of each are required or affected.

Second Principle:

A nuclear emergency will require a coordinated federal and provincial response. Involvement by government emergency management organizations in the response to the off-site consequences of a nuclear emergency should be carried out in accordance with, and respect of, the authorities and jurisdictions of each order of government, and in accordance with relevant federal and provincial agreements.

Third Principle:

An effective response will require federal and provincial cooperation in the planning, preparedness and response phases. Support from one order of government to another must be provided while retaining operational control at that level of government having jurisdictional authority.

Fourth Principle:

The FNEP is intended to complement existing and future provincial nuclear emergency plans or all-hazard contingency plans. These plans should be complementary, and reflect respective provincial and federal roles and capabilities for nuclear emergency planning, preparedness and response.

Fifth Principle:

The FNEP is intended to complement and to facilitate implementation of Canada's international commitments and agreements relevant to nuclear emergencies.

Sixth Principle:

Since each individual department/agency is normally responsible for the implementation of its own emergency plans, the FNEP does not explicitly discuss individual departmental plans.

2.5 Planning Needs

The nuclear emergency planning and preparedness authorities of all orders of government should plan and prepare to respond in accordance with the planning needs listed below. These include the need to:

• 1. Receive prompt and accurate information on all aspects of the event, its impacts, and response actions;
• 2. Provide timely and accurate information to the appropriate government departments and agencies, international organizations, the media and the public;
• 3. Mobilize a wide range of resources, including logistics, scientific and communication resources to prevent and mitigate the consequences; and
• 4. Implement timely and accurate measures in order to protect public health and safety, property and the environment.

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7 For example, the Enrico Fermi nuclear facility is located approximately 40 km southwest of Detroit, State of Michigan, U.S.A., near the Canada/U.S.A. border.